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Introduction 
 
1.1. Research questions 
In the last few years, a connection between the Syrian Civil War, the refugee crisis and 
climate change appeared in media articles and was discussed in policy circles. The Dutch 
Broadcasting Foundation (NOS) published a short video explaining this connection, which 
mentioned climate change as a so-called ‘threat multiplier’ of existing instability. In all my 
years of study, never before did I come across the relationship between climate change and 
conflict. My interest was aroused and the idea for this thesis was born. Initially, my intension 
was to defend and strengthen the argument for a link between climate change and conflict. 
After all, it seemed to make sense that when people lose their livelihoods and migrate to other 
places, only to find themselves with other people in the same situation, tension rises and 
conflict might erupt. My own frame of reference played a part in this. I am deeply concerned 
about a changing climate, our human role in this and the possible future consequences. The 
fact that prominent people like former-president Barack Obama, former vice-president Al 
Gore and UN Messenger of Peace - with a focus on climate change - Leonardo DiCaprio 
spoke out about this, contributed to my view. The picture of climate change as the biggest 
threat to our planet led me to believe that the Syrian conflict must have been the (direct) result 
of climate change. A much-debated article by Kelley et al. (2015) strengthened my beliefs. In 
short, Kelley et al. argue that a drought preceding the Syrian uprisings had contributed to the 
escalation of the conflict. They also argued that the drought was the result of human 
interference with the global climate. In other words, it seemed clear that human induced 
climate change is not only causing rising temperatures, but apparently it is capable of causing 
conflicts as well.  
A few months into my research, however, I realized that reality is not that simple. 
Moreover, such a simplistic statement could even make things worse. It came to my attention 
that shortly after the Kelley et al. research was published, climate change was blamed for 
Syrian Civil War and the refugee flows in the media, followed by politicians making similar 
claims. Newspaper articles implied that climate change did not only pose a threat to Syria 
itself, but also to other countries - even the one in which environmental changes did not occur. 
As a consequence of climate change, ‘climate refugees’ appeared to become a global threat to 
national and international security. My view, and idea for this thesis, had changed. I asked 
myself, why would a war and its consequences be explained with climate change? Why now 
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and not before? What is the process behind this? Who benefits from this? And why is there 
such a focus on the risks and threats of climate change? 
 
This led to my research question: why did climate change become such an influential 
explanation for the Syrian Civil War? 
 
My sub-questions are the following: 
1. In what way did climate change play a role in the eruption of the Syrian Civil War? 
2. In what way did climate change play a role in the migration of Syrians? 
3. What way of conceptualizing the connection between climate change and migration has 
obtained the most influence? 
4. In what way are the Syrian Civil War and the refugees portrayed in the media? 
5. In what way does the alarming narrative facilitate politicians? 
 
1.2. Methods and design 
To strengthen my arguments, the effect of climate change on the events leading up to the 
Syrian uprising and civil war will be examined in a case study. My choice for a ‘within-case’ 
design stems from the fact that I am seeking to find a causal relationship between climate 
change and conflict. Climate change is not the only variable – and I do not wish to imply that 
it is – which makes spuriousness more likely when examining this link. I am aware that 
conflict is caused by multiple factors, of which climate change might be just one. One case 
study is used in order to diminish the chance of spuriousness. To enhance the quality of the 
research and arguments, other possible causal factors of the conflict will be addressed and 
kept in mind.  
The method of process-tracing1 will be used, while at the same time trying to link the 
similarities or differences to the events leading up to the Arab Spring in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region. The choice for process-tracing stems from my aim to identify 
the causal processes between climate change and conflict. The advantage of process-tracing is 
that it can check for spuriousness, also it is a powerful way for observing causal inference. It 
is however, not without its flaws, since “measurement error and omitted variables can lead to 
incorrect inferences in process tracing just as they can in statistical methods” (Bennet 2004, 
																																								 																				
1 “Process tracing looks at the observable implications of putative causal mechanisms in operation in a case [..] 
The goal is to establish which of several possible explanations is consistent with an uninterrupted chain of 
evidence from hypothesized cause to observed effect” (Bennett 2004, 22). 
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24). However, the method is chosen for it can examine the observable implications of causal 
mechanisms in an individual case (Bennet 2004, 35; George & Bennett 2005). Further 
research could take my findings and use this in comparative case studies. 
 Several reasons led to choosing the Syrian Civil War as my case study. First of all, the 
Syrian Civil War, which begun in 2011, resulted in 2 million displaced persons and it is the 
largest refugee catastrophe since World War II. Syria is a relevant case, due to its cross-border 
implications, threatening its own and other territories’ internal stability. Darfur could have 
been a case-study as well, but the choice for Syria stems from its current relevance and the 
fact that scholars and politicians have been paying increased attention on the possible link 
between climate change and the Syrian Civil War. On the other hand, however, the impact of 
climate change is still highly contested and spillover effects like migration and refugees are 
also caused by economic and social factors. De Châtel, for example, recognizes the 
temptation to include climate change as one of the triggers of the Syrian Civil War, but states 
“it is important to keep a clear view of the correlations between different causes and effects of 
events” and “it strengthens the narrative of the Assad regime that seizes every opportunity to 
blame external factors for its own failings and inability to reform” (2014, 532). However, this 
is precisely why there is a need for research on the security implications of climate change. A 
good step has already been taken by the Foresight (2011) report on migration (Theisen et al. 
2013, 621). 
Each separate chapter deals with a sub-question. Chapter one will deal with the first 
one. It starts with giving an overview of the 2011 uprisings and the Syrian Civil War. While 
the first uprisings in Dara’a were peaceful, a disproportionate counterattack by the Syrian 
regime caused the start of a very chaotic and bloody conflict. After this overview, I discuss in 
more depth the Kelley et al. (2015) research on the connection between climate change and 
the conflict in Syria. In short, the argument is as follows: an extreme drought, which was the 
result of human induced climate change, led to a rural-urban migration. This in turn created 
chaos and tensions, which resulted in the civil war. In order to provide a more comprehensive 
explanation about this connection, other scholarly research is used as well. The chapter makes 
clear that climate change could be a ‘threat multiplier’ if the circumstances are ‘right’. The 
Syrian uprising, a shock to many, took place as a result of economic and political factors, 
aggravated by the government’s unsustainable water policies, resource mismanagement and 
failure to adequately deal with the drought. I end the chapter with a discussion of the current 
scholarly debate regarding the climate-conflict nexus. 
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Chapter two answers the question regarding the impact of climate change on migration. The 
chapter demonstrates that this relationship is a very complicated one, different in every 
context. Climate change could cause environmental changes, such as droughts or floods. This 
in turn could indeed affect migration. However, it depends on multiple factors and other 
drivers whether the migration takes place over a long or short distance, whether it will be for a 
short period of time or permanent, and whether the migration is voluntary, forced or a 
combination of the two. The mega drought played a role in the internal rural-urban migration 
in Syria. One must, however, not forget that people also might be trapped in place, unable to 
move because of the economic hardships the drought might have caused. Further internal 
migration took place during the conflict, which was therefore the result of the violence, not 
the drought. Most importantly, the external or international migration is the result of the 
violence as well, and cannot be attributed to the drought. 
Chapter three provides background to the media and political discourse on the 
connection between climate change, conflict and migration. In order to better comprehend 
why this discourse has taken root, this chapter discusses the most influential perspectives on 
the relationship between humans and the environment, also known as human ecology. I will 
demonstrate that Malthusian thinking, while simplistic and not based on solid evidence, 
appeals to most people. The ‘alarming’ perspective is based on this line of thinking. I provide 
counterarguments against the use of this narrative, in line with the ‘sceptic perspective’ and 
the framework of political ecology, which stresses that the human-environment relationship 
cannot be seen without taking politics into consideration. My arguments in this thesis are 
based on this sceptic perspective and framework of political ecology. 
In chapter four, a discourse analysis is made on the media narrative regarding climate 
change and Syria. The media narrative is of importance for its influence on government 
activity and public opinion. I give a short overview of media representations on climate 
change. The media narrative on Syria is clearly an alarming one, depicting the conflict and the 
refugees as the result of climate change. Thereby it also makes claims about future mass 
displacement and chaos. By reviewing multiple newspapers, it becomes clear that the overall 
narrative is a simplistic and sensational one, but powerful enough to influence politics and 
public opinion. 
Chapter five explains why this way of framing the conflict has received so much 
attention by the media and politicians. The alarming narrative is beneficial for its users and 
appealing for its audience because of the securitization of climate change that has taken place 
in the last few decades. After a short overview of the securitization process, the benefits for 
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climate activists and politicians are discussed. The consequences are striking, however. 
Internal displaced persons tend to be overlooked, refugees are stigmatized and risk losing 
their right to protection and security, the responsibility of the human agents of conflicts tends 
to be diminished because the causes of war are de-politicized and it has led to the 
militarization of climate change. The latter could potentially shift the focus away from 
mitigation and adaptation measures to combat climate change, to a focus on defence. The 
chapter ends with a few comments on the politicized environment that occurred as a result. 
The environment and climate change have become political tools, diminishing the moral 
responsibility from the actual agents of conflicts and human misery. 
This thesis ends with my conclusion. By focusing on climate change, conflicts are 
perceived as being the result of one dimension. Climate change has become a political tool to 
promote one’s own interest, be it a call for climate action, securing one’s borders or arguing 
for better defence mechanisms to combat climate change. As will become clear, we should be 
wary of securitizing the climate in such a way, for it does not protect the environment, does 
not stop climate change and is of no help to the people suffering from the poor economic and 
political circumstances, be they aggravated by climate change or not. 
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Chapter one 
 
Climate change and conflict in Syria 
 
1.1. Historical overview: the 2011 uprisings and the Syrian Civil War 
The start of the Syrian Civil War can be traced back to the peaceful demonstration in Dara’a. 
On that day, in March 2011, the Syrian government fired the first shots. Only a few months 
later, a significant part of the Syrian people decided to fight back, supported by defected 
members of the Syrian troops who called themselves the Free Syrian Army. With this, the 
initially peaceful uprising resulted in a bloody civil war by January 2012 (De Châtel 2014, 
521; Hokayem 2013, 9).2 Many armed groups made use of the chaos that swept the country. 
Already in mid-2011, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) set up its new branch in Syria called Jabhat al-
Nusra. It officially announced its formation at the beginning of 2012. Meanwhile, Syrian 
Kurdisch groups, which have longed for autonomy for a long time, took up arms against 
Assad. A few months later, the Syrian Civil War has turned into a proxy war when Iran 
intervened on Assad’s behalf and the Gulf States started to financially support the rebels, 
mainly through Turkey. Hezbollah, with help from Iran, joined the war on the side of Assad, 
after which the Gulf States sent even more money and weapons to the rebels, this time also 
through Jordan. In 2013, the Middle East was extremely divided between Sunni powers 
backing the rebels and Shi’i powers on the side of the Syrian regime. The conflict became 
even more chaotic after Assad used chemical weapons against his own citizens in the town of 
Ghouta. For the United States (U.S.), Assad has taken matters much too far with this action. 
On September 10, 2013, then-president Obama mentions in his speech: “Men, women, 
children, lying in rows, killed by poison gas […] it is in the national security interest of the 
United States to respond to the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons to a targeted military 
strike” (Obama 2013). In response, Russia proposed to Syria to surrender its control of 
chemical weapons to the international community to avoid a U.S. military strike, upon which 
the U.S. decides to back down (Hanlon & Christie 2016, 8). However, a few weeks later, a 
U.S. training program from the CIA started to aid the rebels. With that, the U.S. became an 
active participant in the war. 
 The war is transformed once again in February 2014. An Al-Qaeda affiliate, which 
was mostly based in Iraq, breaks away from the group due to internal disagreements. The 
faction calls itself the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), later to be called IS. IS does not 
																																								 																				
2 This paper defines civil war as “armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between 
parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities” (Kalyvas 2006, 17). 
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fight against Assad, but rather targets the rebels and the Kurds, thereby increasingly claiming 
territory and declaring the Islamic Caliphate. IS is considered a major security threat to the 
U.S., which is therefore determined to move ahead with its air strikes against them. A new 
training program by the Pentagon has started to train the rebels to fight IS instead of Assad. 
Meanwhile, Turkey was bombing the Kurds, even those which are fighting against IS, and it 
does not target IS itself. This has led to increased tension with the US, but also adds to the 
confusion as to where the U.S. stands. Assad has been losing ground all this time, but finds 
himself an ally in Russia in September 2015 when Russia starts to fight on his behalf. Russia, 
however, claims to be fighting IS, but in fact only attacks anti-Assad rebels (Vox 2017). As of 
today, there still seems no end in sight for this terrible civil war. 
 
1.2. Climate change: a ‘threat multiplier’? 
 
“Of course [it is because of the drought]. The drought and unemployment were important in 
pushing people toward revolution. When the drought happened, we could handle it for two years, 
and then we said, ‘It’s enough’.” (Interview displaced Syrian farmer, quoted in Kelley et al. 2015, 
3245). 
 
The study conducted by Kelley et al. in 2015 has put forward evidence that “anthropogenic 
forcing has increased the probability of severe and persistent droughts in this region […] and 
made the occurrence of a 3-year drought as severe as that of 2007-2010 two to three times 
more likely than by natural variability alone” (2015, 3241). This extreme drought3, which 
lasted multiple years, affected the Syrian people and their already vulnerable living conditions 
in such a way that it played a part in the start of the uprisings. This section does not diminish 
the social, economic and institutional conditions that increase the likelihood of violence, but 
demonstrates in what way climate change has the potential to worsen such conditions, which 
has happened in Syria (Solow 2013, 180). This part argues there is a connection, albeit a very 
complex one, between climate change and the likelihood of conflict. 
 Climate change is expected to change weather patterns and affect livelihoods in 
multiple ways. Changes in temperatures, rising sea levels, diminished river flows, severe 
storms and excessive or diminished rainfall are all part of the consequences of climate change, 
even though it is still very difficult to determine where and in what severity this will take 
place in the future. For Syria, the increased likelihood of severe droughts is of special 
																																								 																				
3 While in the academic literature and media this drought is revered to as a ‘mega drought’, this is not correct. A 
mega drought lasts multiple decades, which is not the case for this one. Therefore, I refer to this drought as an 
extreme drought, to emphasize its impact and the fact that it lasted multiple years. 
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importance. In the first decade of this century, an extreme drought occurred in the Fertile 
Crescent.4 Syria has experienced six droughts in the last century, but five of them were only 
one-season droughts. In contrast, this last drought was a multiyear drought with enormous 
agricultural consequences. In 2007/2008, already 97,1 percent of Syria’s vegetation was 
affected, herders had lost 85 percent of their livestock and by 2009 over 800.000 people had 
lost their livelihoods. This resulted in the fact that many “farmers and herders had little choice 
but to move elsewhere, starve, or demand change” (Werrel, Femia & Sternberg 2015, 32-4). It 
is estimated that 1.5 million people moved from rural to urban areas within Syria. This 
movement was preceded by a migration flow of around 1.5 million Iraqi refugees to Syria in 
the years between 2003 and 2007 (Kelley et al. 2015, 3241). 
 The extreme climatic circumstances, even though experienced as a gradual change, 
had worsened the existing conditions and vulnerability of the Syrian people. Syria was indeed 
a country characterized by conditions of which has been proven that they increase the 
likelihood of violence (Fearon & Laitin 2003, 75-6, 83-5, 88). It has experienced corruption, 
high unemployment rates, inadequate government policies and inequality for a long time. 
Even though the country was considered relatively stable, in the years before the uprising it 
suffered from decreasing economic health, pressures on its water resources were growing and 
civil unrest and calls for political reform were sweeping over the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region (Gleick 2014, 331). The government’s failure to respond to the 
growing grievances, such as the rising rural poverty, was one of the most important triggers 
for the uprisings (De Châtel 2014, 524-32; Hokayem 2013, 13, 19). However, these 
conditions were present long before the uprisings started and Syria had always been regarded 
as a relatively stable country in the Middle East. The fact that the Arab Spring uprisings 
reached Syria was, therefore, a surprise for many. 
The uprisings are not so surprising anymore when one takes into account the 
aforementioned extreme drought that occurred in the years before the uprisings. The people 
that moved from rural to urban areas, found themselves with fellow sufferers – either 
complaining about the government, the lack of food or the rising unemployment. For example, 
Dara’a, the city where the uprisings began, experienced five years of drought and received 
little assistance from the state. This created a breeding ground for unrest and discontent about 
the living conditions (Campbell & Goddard 2015; Kelley et al. 2015, 3245). There is a 
consensus in academic literature that rapid demographic change ignites instability and it is 
																																								 																				
4 The Fertile Crescent is an area encompassing parts of Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the 
Palestinian Territories, Syria and Turkey. 
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more likely that harsh conditions and vulnerability increase tensions when a lot of people 
move to the same place (Kelley et al 2015, 3242). The migration increased urban 
unemployment and this resulted in social unrest, an occurrence previously found in other 
cases and studies (Gleick 2014, 333; Goldstone 2002, 10). Importantly, the presence of 
poverty and inequality, grievances present in Syria, do not cause violence on their own. 
According to the Climate and Migration Coalition, such grievances did not severely cause 
tensions between people, but was directed at the Syrian regime (Randall 2016). People 
mobilized and started to work together, instead of fighting each other. This is why the initial 
uprisings were peaceful, just as they were during the Arab Spring in other countries. 
Disproportionate violence by the government has turned the events in a bloody civil war. 
 Climate also played a role in the Arab Spring outside of Syria. Climate change seems 
to be a necessary causal factor, even though it was not able to trigger the events on its own. 
Rather, it amplified existing grievances. The Arab Spring took place in a context of discontent 
about government policies. Drivers such as a youth bulge, sectarian divides, government 
oppression and economic insecurity, are well known factors that led to the civil unrest (Werrel, 
Femia & Sternberg 2015, 29). For example, youth bulges have been associated with political 
crises. Young people – also the ones that participated in the first demonstrations in Syria – are 
more easily summoned to participate in such events. They have fewer responsibilities, which 
makes them more prone to participate in civil unrest. They also feel more attracted to radical 
sects that promise liberation and an overall better future (Goldstone 2002, 11; Hanlon & 
Christie 2016, 20; Klare 2007, 357-9). This has made extreme Islamist groups rather 
successful, for such movements are likely to take root in such circumstances. 
The bigger context of the uprisings of the Arab Spring should not be overlooked. 
Extreme weather across the globe had caused a surge in food prices, resulting in the fact that 
in 2011 the food price index had exceeded the already extremely high levels of 2008 
(Johnstone & Mazo 2011, 11-13). The global food crisis, combined with inadequate 
government policies to address people’s grievances, contributed to increased instability. It is 
true, for example, that both Egypt and Syria suffered from mismanagement leading to water 
and food insecurities (Werrel, Femia & Sternberg 2015, 30). The Arab spring was, therefore, 
a “textbook example of complex causality and the role of climate change as a threat multiplier” 
(Johnstone & Mazo 2011, 11). Simply put, threat multipliers make conditions even worse 
than they already are. In this case, it means that climate change has heightened other threats: 
the drought was a catalyst in the unrest that swept the Syrian nation, eventually resulting in 
the Syrian Civil War. 
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1.3. Why Syria? 
 
“It is when extreme events affect people with high levels of vulnerability that they become 
disasters” (Tacoli 2011, 115). 
 
Whether climate change will act as a threat multiplier depends on the country and its 
circumstances. States that are relatively vulnerable may have more difficulty to provide 
protection from climate change, which could increase the likelihood of conflict (Barnett & 
Adger 2007, 641-3, 649-51; Hanlon & Christie 2016, 44). In other words, it depends on a 
state’s ability to adapt and its degree of vulnerability.5 Only if a state is able to adapt and 
mitigate its vulnerability, climate change is less likely to act like a threat multiplier. It makes 
sense that the relatively wealthy states that experience adequate governance will be much 
more able to do so, than a state such as Syria. However, the question remains why Syria was 
hit to such an extent, even though the drought affected multiple countries in the region. 
 Syria is a country defined by water scarcity. It is heavily depending on rainfall to 
cultivate the lands and the rest of the land depends on groundwater irrigation. However, not 
only diminished rainfall, but also the government’s water policy is, to a large amount, to 
blame for the population’s vulnerability to the extreme drought of the previous decade. It has 
been widely known that Syrian agricultural policies and water management are extremely 
unsustainable (Barnes 2009, 521-3; FAO, WFP and Syrian Ministry of Agriculture and 
Agricultural Reform 2012, 6; Gleick 2014, 332-3). Close ties between the ruling Ba’th party 
and the agricultural sector, which can be traced back to former president Assad, have resulted 
in biased water policies.6 In recent times, the Syrian regime has promoted water sensitive 
agriculture, such as cotton. Groundwater resources have diminished due to the government’s 
unsustainable policies. The decline in groundwater resources exhausted the buffer, which was 
needed for years with decreased precipitation, such as the years during the extreme drought. 
This further increased the population’s vulnerability. The government did not intend to 
increase the country’s water scarcity, but it did have an unsustainable water policy by 
choosing to focus on cotton for export and striving for food self-sufficiency (Barnes 2009, 
520). In sum, the government’s water policy errors contributed to growing social, economic 
																																								 																				
5 Vulnerability can be defined as “the potential for loss or harm due to some external stress”, whereas adaptation 
takes place “through adjustments to reduce vulnerability or enhance resilience to observed or expected changes 
in climate, and involves changes in processes, perceptions, practices and functions”. Moreover, “vulnerability 
differs across households, communities and regions, as the fundamental components of vulnerability differ 
significantly over space and time” (Brown & McLeman 2009, 294). This thesis will come back to this issue in 
chapter two and three. 
6 For an extensive discussion about this relationship, see Barnes (2009). 
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and political uncertainty and discontent. Or, in Saleeby’s words: “the regime’s failure to put 
in place economic measures to alleviate the effects of the drought was a critical driver in 
propelling such massive mobilizations of dissent” (2012). 
 
1.4. Critique to and support for the climate – conflict nexus 
Conflicts are unique events, never caused by the same set of causal factors. They are the result 
of complex causal chains, in which it is often difficult to determine which one was a 
significant contributor. The Syrian Civil War is no exception. As discussed, Syria is 
characterized by many factors that are commonly known to increase the likelihood of civil 
violence. Climate change was one of them – it did not solely cause the violence, but played an 
indirect role in its occurrence. There is, however, still much debate about this link between 
climate change and conflict. 
 Global environmental change7 has gotten increased attention over the last years. An 
increasingly widespread view regards climate change as one of the greatest challenges to 
global peace (Theisen et al. 2013, 614). This link between climate change and conflict has not 
only been made in the case of Syria, most importantly by the study of Kelley et al. (2015), but 
also by other scholars. Incidences as droughts in India, heat waves in the U.S., civil wars on 
the African continent and ethnic violence in Europe, have all been used by scholars to support 
the claim that a shift in the global climate is linked to a lot of violence in the world. American 
scientists, for example, argued that even small changes in rainfall or temperature can be 
associated with violence either committed by individuals or groups, possibly leading to war 
(Hanlon & Christie 2016, 43). It has also been argued that hot temperatures are linked to 
individual aggression and a recent study found that years which are relatively warmer than 
usual increase the risk of violence. Moreover, violence has also been associated with wet 
periods after extreme rainfall (Anderson 2001, 33-6; Hendrix & Salehyan 2012, 42-6; Hsiang 
et al. 2013, 9-10). In sum, climate change has been increasingly linked to violence and the 
eruption of conflict. Importantly, this link is an indirect and very complex one, different in 
every case. 
At the other side of the debate, other studies disregard a link all together. Salehyan, for 
example, argues that climate change is not useful in predicting the likelihood of conflicts. He 
claims that human agency, the role of political institutions and technological innovations are 
																																								 																				
7  Global environmental change is the phenomenon of “natural and human induced changes in the Earth’s 
environment, affecting land use and land cover, biodiversity, atmospheric composition and climate” (Page 2002, 
27). 
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the factors causing conflicts (2008, 317-19). Evans argues weak governance contributes to 
problems that are associated with scarcity, thereby suggesting that people in fragile states are 
more at risk (2010, 6, 10). Claiming climate change is solely responsible for conflict is 
“misleading and misses recognizing the complexity of the various potential threats to human 
security” (Evans 2010, 17; Hanlon & Christie 2016, 45-6). Theisen et al. found no support for 
a link between drought and conflict (Theisen et al. 2013, 618-9). Other scholars claim that 
environment does play a role, albeit not such an important one as economic and political 
factors (Goldstone 2002, 6-14; Hanlon & Christie 2016, 43). Most of these studies, however, 
focus on environmental degradation and issues such as international water disputes. They do 
not talk extensively about climate change in the way it has occurred in Syria.8 While not all 
scholars accept a link between climate change and violent conflict, there is a growing 
consensus that when states are not able to deal with the consequences of climatic changes, the 
likelihood of violence increases (Barnett & Adger 2007, 643, 649-51; Buhaug et al. 2010, 12-
16, 22-25, 30-33; Hanlon & Christie 2016, 44; Theisen et al. 2013, 622). In other words, even 
more sceptic scholars do acknowledge that climate change can ‘cause’ conflict indirectly. 
Other factors that bring about conflicts are therefore not less important, but they are 
intensified by climate change, thus resulting in an indirect causal link.  
Concluding, there seems to be a complex connection between human interference with 
the global climate, the severe drought in Syria and the mass migration within Syria from rural 
to urban areas, which influenced existing factors such as vulnerability, government policies 
and instability.9 The government did little to alleviate people’s growing grievances, both in 
the rural areas and urban centres. Moreover, research has shown that “where urban population 
growth is not matched by an increase in economic growth, risks of political turbulence 
increase” (Goldstone 2002, 10). The migration, therefore, resulted in rising unemployment 
and inequality, which only aggravated the existing social unrest. By this means, growing 
discontent in the urban peripheries increased the likelihood of conflict, which is supported by 
the conflict literature stating that rapid demographic change encourages instability (Gleick 
2014, 333; Kelley et al. 2015, 3242). Importantly, the drought and the resulting scarcity did 
not ignite violence between the Syrian people, but was directed against the state. The context 
of the Arab Spring, therefore, cannot be overlooked. 
																																								 																				
8 For example, Baechler (1998) and Hauge & Ellingsen (1998). 
9 According to Kelley et al., “no natural cause is apparent for these trends, whereas the observed drying and 
warming are consistent with model studies of the response to increases in greenhouse gasses” and the Syrian 
drought was “more than twice as likely as a consequence of human interference in the climate system” (2015, 
3241). 
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Chapter two 
 
The story of Syrian migration 
 
2.1. Climate change and migration 
It has been widely acknowledged that climate change is able to re-shape future patterns of 
human movement. However, the way this will happen has most often been misunderstood. 
This chapter discusses more in depth how the internal and external migration took place, both 
before and during the Syrian Civil War. Research in climate change and migration still 
contains many gaps. Importantly, migration is not only a reaction to weather changes, but also 
depends on one’s vulnerability and ability to adapt (Black et al. 2011, S4). The Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre describes the climate-migration nexus in the following way, 
which is applicable to the case of Syria: 
 
“The worst impacts of slow-onset hazards and processes take months to decades to manifest. 
Population movements in these contexts are best understood along a continuum from 
voluntary to forced, with some households using migration as an early adaptive measure to 
increase their resilience. Patterns of displacement among people in severe distress may 
involve dispersed movements as well as tipping points into whole community displacements. 
At the same time, others unable to move away, may become trapped in life-threatening 
situations.” (IDMC 2017b). 
 
Migration is different in every region and circumstance, which is why there is hardly a 
consensus concerning the drivers for migration, with theories offering several explanations 
rooted in political, economic and social factors. A comprehensive framework is set up by 
Black et al. (2011). They agree that migration depends on social, economic, political and 
demographic factors. Additionally, they add environmental change in two ways. First, as a 
direct driver, for example the exposure to hazards and changes in ecosystem services, such as 
water and food. Second, as an indirect driver it affects the other four drivers (Black et al. 2011, 
S5).10 Whether one decides to move, depends not only on these drivers, but also on personal 
characteristics and intervening obstacles, for example ethnicity and costs of moving 
respectively. All drivers seldom act in isolation, but reinforce and interact with each other, 
eventually leading up to the decision whether or not one will move. In other words, it depends 
on a person’s decision, which is influenced by personal characteristics and one’s ability to 
move or stay (Black et al. 2015, S10). 
 
																																								 																				
10 For the complete overview of this framework, see Black et al. 2015, S5, figure 2. 
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2.2. Climate change and internal migration in Syria 
As discussed above, migration from rural to urban areas has played a part in the complex 
causal chain between climate change and the outbreak of the violence. Internal migration in 
this paper is meant to be migration that “refers to the forced movement of people within the 
country they live in” (IDMC 2017a). Already in 2009, herders have started to move in large 
quantities from their lands to urban areas and the south in search for work. By 2011, around 2 
to 3 million people were driven into extreme poverty, according to a United Nations (U.N.) 
report (Femia & Werrel 2012, 1; Werrel, Femia & Sternberg 2015, 33).11 As mentioned, it 
was estimated that around 1.5 million people moved from rural areas to the peripheries of 
urban areas due to crop failures and loss of livestock (Kelley et al. 2015, 3241).  
While the drought was a significant driver for internal migration, it still should be seen 
separately from other matters. First, a large part of the Syrian population depends on 
agriculture. A change in environment, such as the extreme drought, directly affected their 
livelihood and well-being as a result of reducing crops and livestock. Besides that, it 
indirectly affected their well-being and cause for migration, by influencing the economic 
driver. It influenced this economic driver by reducing their household incomes. Importantly, 
however, not all people will be migrating as a result. While a lot of them did, it is striking that 
the most vulnerable and poor people will not be able to migrate, precisely because of their 
diminished incomes (Black et al. 2011, S6-8). In other words, environmental change can have 
different impacts on one’s motivation and ability to move, which is not any different in the 
case of Syria. 
Second, and more importantly, the Syrian government failed to address the decreasing 
human security12 of the people in rural areas. After initially ignoring the crisis, the Syrian 
regime made two appeals to the U.N. to finance development projects, but they only received 
a fraction of the needed funds. The regime itself also downplayed the severity of the crisis for 
a long time. It restricted foreign media coverage and internally used the framework of the 
global financial crisis and climate change to demonstrate Syria was a victim of external 
factors beyond its control (De Châtel 2014, 526-8). Moreover, the estimated number of 1.5 
																																								 																				
11 According to the New York Times, “the four-year drought in Syria has pushed two million to three million 
people into extreme poverty, according to a survey completed here this month [October 2010] by the United 
Nations special rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter” (Worth 2010). 
12  Human security entails the “protection of vulnerable individuals to threats and dangers posed by their 
environment. […] and has a normative bias in favour of the individual in a similar way as human rights” (Hanlon 
& Christie 2016, 4). 
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million internal displacements has been criticized by other research.13 The number is much 
lower and just as much caused by the abrupt stop of government subsidies and fertilizers than 
the drought (Boas 2017; Selby & Hulme 2015). Since the Syrian government did not alleviate 
its population’s vulnerability – and also increased Syria’s water scarcity as discussed above – 
this political driver contributed to the increased migration flows from rural to urban areas. In 
sum, climate change was a significant driver for the initial internal migration, but the other 
drivers still should not be overlooked. Migration is never the result of one simple cause, but it 
is the result of a complex web of interplaying drivers and motivations. 
 
2.3. Violence and internal migration in Syria 
 
“Warring parties conduct hostilities with little, if any, regard for the laws of war and, in 
particular, its foundational principle of distinction. Regardless of the belligerent involved, the 
majority of attacks are not directed at a specific military objective or fail to employ a method 
or means of combat that can be directed at a specific military objective. Indiscriminate attacks 
on residential areas have led to massive casualties among Syrian civilians” (UN General 
Assembly 2015, 6).  
 
The internal displacement of the Syrian people does not get as much attention as the much 
more visible external migration. However, internally displaced people in Syria constitute 
around two-thirds of the total displaced people by the conflict. At the time of writing, with the 
conflict in its seventh year, around 6.3 million people have been internally displaced by the 
ongoing violence, which includes the bombing and shelling of civilian-inhabited areas 
(Mooney 2014, 44-5). Half of the Syrian population has been forced to flee their place of 
residence, most of them multiple times (WFP 2017, 1-4).14 Widespread attacks on civilians 
have forced them to seek refuge somewhere else, with not enough measures to protect them. 
This displacement is a risky event in itself. According to the UN Human Rights Council’s 
International Commission of Inquiry, the majority lacks safe access to water, medical care, 
food and shelter (UN General Assembly 2015, 9-10, 13-14). The conflict added more 
economic and political drivers to migrate. Before the conflict started, the internal migration 
flows were initially a response strategy, a way of adapting to the changing weather, which is 
often the case for internal migration (Black et al. 2011, S7). Yet, after the start of the civil war, 
one’s ability to return home to their land was severely diminished as a result of the ongoing 
violence. 
																																								 																				
13 According to Mahmoud Solh, the director-general of ICARDA (International Center for Agricultural Research 
in the Dry Areas), internal migration figures ranged from 40.000 – 60.000 families and the Syrian government 
estimated that around 200.000 – 300.000 migrated (Selby & Hulme 2015; Solh 2010). 
14 This analysis is also regularly updated by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre: unocha.org/syria. 
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2.4. External migration: climate refugees? 
The Syrian Civil War has caused millions of displaced persons and it has been claimed that it 
has led to one of the largest refugee crises since the Second World War (Hanlon & Christie 
2016, 125). A very clear consequence of the Syrian Civil War is the enormous number of 
refugees who have fled the country, with a total of more than 5 million as of January 2017 
(United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2017). Most of them are housed in refugee 
camps in Lebanon and Turkey, with a large number of them trying to move to Europe. This is 
a very expensive and uncertain journey, which demonstrates that the horrors those people 
were facing were so severe that risking their lives to move to another country is the better 
alternative. Since climate change obtained a central role in explaining the Syrian Civil War, 
the resulting refugee crisis has likewise been explained with factors such as population 
pressures, the drought and climate change (De Châtel 2014, 530-32). Especially since 2015, 
various media reports have made claims that the refugees are ‘climate refugees’. 15  The 
framing of them as climate refugees is discussed in greater detail below, for now it is ample to 
say that factors such as the unsustainable water management, agricultural policies and the 
bigger context of the Arab Spring should not be overlooked. It is tempting to use climate 
change as the sole cause, but it is important to not forget the government’s failure to 
adequately deal with environmental changes. Thus, in contrast to the internal displacement 
prior to the civil war, it is incorrect to conclude that external migration is caused by climate 
change. The displacement during the conflict is a result of the violence – and the resulting 
insecurity and poverty – not the extreme drought. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
15 The term ‘environmental refugee’ was officially used for the first time by El-Hinnawi in a report called 
‘Environmental Refugees’. In that report, environmental refugees are defined as those who are “forced to leave 
their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural 
and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life” (El-
Hinnawi 1985, 4). 
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Chapter three 
 
Perspectives on the human-environment relationship 
 
The previous chapters have demonstrated two important things. First, it makes a lot of sense 
to link climate change with an increased likelihood of violent conflict and migration. Second, 
it is not nearly as simple as the previous point seems to be. However, this simplified view is 
exactly what politicians, environmentalists, the media and various scholars – albeit often with 
good intentions – are repeating. To call the displaced persons outside of Syria ‘climate 
refugees’ is not only false but has political consequences as well. This section demonstrates 
that over time, particular lines of thinking have created an environment wherein ‘climate war’ 
and ‘climate refugees’ seem the most logical ways of explaining the current situation. This 
chapter starts by laying out the most important arguments regarding human-environment 
relationships16 – ecoscarcity, modernization and political ecology. Then it explains the debate 
between ‘alarmists’ and ‘sceptics’ in media, academic and policy circles, which reflects to a 
large extent the aforementioned viewpoints. The ‘climate refugee’ narrative regarding the 
Syrian refugees will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
3.1. Malthusian ‘ecoscarcity’ 
The ecoscarcity argument derives from Malthusian thinking, which can be traced back to the 
18th century with the publication of Thomas Malthus’ ‘Essay on the Principle of Population’. 
In short, the argument is as follows: “as human populations grow out of proportion to the 
capacity of the environmental system to support them, there is a crisis both for humans, whose 
numbers fall through starvation and disease-based mortality, and for nature, whose overused 
assets are driven past the point of self-renewal” (Robbins 2012, 14). With an apocalyptic 
manner of speaking, the argument entails that population growth will result in scarcity, 
poverty and famine, resulting in chaos and instability. It is a rather intuitive approach. 
Dividing limited resources by a growing number of people will result in increasingly less 
resources to divide. An important consequence of thinking in this manner is that the problem 
involves the number of people, rather than the economy or government policies. Scarcity and 
famine are therefore inevitable, rather than preventable. Population control is the solution, not 
a different distribution of goods. In this way, Neo-Malthusianism – focused more on the 
																																								 																				
16 This theme is also known as human ecology. It concerns the interconnectedness between the environment and 
people and “attempts to provide a perspective that bridges the gap between the natural and social sciences 
(Wessels 2008, 31). 
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prospect of environmental degradation and famine than Malthus did – argues for population 
control as the solution to the appalling conditions resulting from overpopulation.  
While this is an intuitive and appealing way of thinking about the relationship between 
humans and the environment, it is essentially flawed. The catastrophic prognoses offered by 
Malthusian thinking are criticized in various ways. Without going into detail, the 
‘modernization’ argument entails that when goods become scarcer, people will come up with 
innovative and creative solutions in response. They either use the good more efficiently or 
demand will decrease, by using different technologies or creating substitutes (Robbins 2012, 
16-17). When resources such as oil dry up, other alternatives such as solar power become 
worthy alternatives. There are several problems with this argument as well, the most 
important one probably that history has not provided strong evidence for environmental 
benefits resulting of the optimization of technologies and markets in underdeveloped states 
(Robbins 2012, 19). What both the ecoscarcity and modernization arguments fail to 
acknowledge is the significant political influence. Another way of thinking about the 
environment and human-environment interaction is therefore given by the ‘political ecology’ 
framework. It reflects the sceptic perspective to a large extent and is the framework on which 
the argument in this thesis is based. 
 
3.2. Political ecology 
 
“Political ecology presents a Jekyll and Hyde persona, attempting to do two things at once: 
critically explaining what is wrong with dominant accounts of environmental change, while at 
the same time exploring alternatives, adaptations, and creative human action in the face of 
mismanagement and exploitation: offering both a “hatchet” to take apart flawed, dangerous, 
and politically problematic accounts, and a “seed”, to grow into new socio-ecologies” 
(Robbins 2012, 20). 
  
Political ecology is “an approach to investigating human-environment relationships that 
emphasizes the economic and political processes affecting access to and use of land and 
resources” (Castree, Kitchin & Rogers 2013, 379). The movement started in the 1960s in 
reaction to the problems caused by industrialization. In the 1970s, the movement grew and got 
a nation-state political focus (Doyle & McEachern 1998, 66). Political ecologists reject 
arguments that environmental problems are solely the result of overpopulation or oblivious 
land-users in underdeveloped countries. Rather, it should be seen in light of national and 
international relationships in which the land and its users are caught up. In other words, “costs 
and benefits associated with environmental change are for the most part distributed among 
actors unequally … [which inevitably] reinforces or reduces existing social and economic 
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inequalities … [which holds] political implications in terms of the altered power of actors in 
relation to other actors” (Bryant and Bailey 1997, 28-9; Robbins 2012, 20). In other words, 
environmental change can be regarded as the product of a political process. Importantly, the 
likelihood of environmental conflict rises when state institutions, elites or other groups 
enhance scarcity. Conflicts regarding the environment and its resources are therefore part of a 
larger political context.17 
 
3.3. The alarmist perspective 
 
“Evidence is fast accumulating that, within our children’s lifetimes, severe droughts, storms 
and heat waves caused by climate change could rip apart societies from one side of the planet 
to the other. Climate stress may well represent a challenge to international security just as 
dangerous – and more intractable – than the arms race between the United States and the 
Soviet Union during the cold war or the proliferation of nuclear weapons among rogue states 
today” (Homer-Dixon 2007). 
 
The alarmist perspective offers a familiar discourse, based on Malthusian environmental 
explanations. It is no surprise that politicians, the media, civil society and environmentalists 
often use this discourse. It is called ‘alarming’ for its focus on the possibility of extreme 
future implications of climate change and its impact on (human) security. Or in other words, 
the perspective argues that environmental changes contribute to insecurity, most often with 
rather apocalyptic visions. This narrative has gotten more authority after the Cold War, when 
the notion of human security became more prominent. In line with Malthusian thinking, the 
main idea focused on the environmental degradation and the resulting migration as a 
consequence of population pressures (Hartmann 2010, 234-5). As the perspective evolved, 
human displacement became a more prominent issue. The perspective argues “environmental 
disruptions, among which the impacts of climate change in particular, will induce massive 
population displacement” (Gemenne 2011, 226). Thomas Homer-Dixon, a prominent scholar 
within this line of thinking, focuses especially on the security implications of climate change 
and argues that climate change will directly cause “waves of environmental refugees that spill 
across borders with destabilizing effects on the recipient’s domestic order and on international 
stability” (Homer-Dixon 1991, 77). His legacy still persists in media and policy circles, 
especially the link between climate change and conflict and the ‘threat’ of ‘environmental 
refugees’. 
																																								 																				
17 Political ecology deals with a number of other related questions and subjects, which are laid out in more detail 
by Robbins (2012). 
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While it has received much criticism, which is discussed in more detail below, one could 
hardly blame the many people using this narrative. They are most often deeply concerned 
about climate change and the possible threats involved. The alarmist perspective gives such 
actors the ability to make their case for new policies to protect the environment and people 
suffering from such a changing environment (Gemenne 2011, 230-2). However, the term 
‘environmental refugee’ should be used with caution. 
 
3.4. The sceptic perspective 
 
“This deterministic perspective serves many worthwhile goals, and highlights in particular the 
need to fight against climate change. Thus portraying ‘climate refugees’ as the human face of 
climate change is helpful in many ways, but certainly not to accurately describe the realities of 
migration associated with environmental changes” (Gemenne 2011, 254). 
 
In contrast to the alarmist perspective, the sceptics argue “migration is multicausal by nature, 
and that environmental drivers should not be set apart from other migration drivers” 
(Gemenne 2011, 226). To call certain refugees ‘environmental refugees’ has several 
shortcomings. In claiming that people are displaced because of one factor, other economic or 
political factors lose significance. It has yet to be proven that people move because of one sole 
reason. Moreover, it cloaks the importance of the role of political responses to environmental 
degradation and it overemphasizes the role of demographic pressure, while there is little 
evidence for this. In other words, the term ‘environmental refugee’ does not “help us 
understand the complex processes at work in specific situations of impoverishment, conflict 
and displacement” (Castles 2002, 5; Hartmann 2010, 235). The alarmist perspective has the 
tendency to overreact indeed. Sensational stories of ‘hundreds of millions’ of refugees 
crossing borders in the future were not supported by strong evidence. Most of the scientific 
evidence concludes that much of the migration caused by human-induced climate change will 
take place internally, or over a short distance to neighbouring states. The predictions provided 
by the alarming discourse will probably not happen. According to the sceptics it is therefore 
both an unworkable and unethical way of framing climate change. It is counterproductive, 
merely focused on short-term solutions (White 2011, 7-9). 
Two scholars have been particularly critical of the alarmist perspective. Gaim Kibreab 
argued that framing environmental displacement in such a way gives politicians a reason to 
neglect their obligations to provide asylum because an environment criterion is not present in 
the 1951 Geneva Convention (1997, 21). The causes of migration are depoliticized, 
diminishing politicians’ obligations. The convention only recognizes refugees who are faced 
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with persecution and the term is therefore a political construct (Gemenne 2011, 239, 248-9). 
In response, some have called for modifications of the Convention to include people who are 
displaced by environmental changes. However, various scholars working on refugee rights 
have criticized this plight. They are afraid that it would be used to further restrict the 
responsibility to help displaced people. They also argue that, even though the convention does 
not recognize environmental refugees, it could still be of help to them if they are also 
subjected to recognized criteria, such as conflict, which is often the case. 
Richard Black argued in a similar manner that the climate-migration nexus advocated 
an extension of this convention in order to protect those displaced by the environment. He 
claims, however, that climate as the sole driver for migration is never the case and it might 
lead to stricter asylum policies in European and North American states (Black 1998, 1-23; 
Gemenne 2011, 239-41). Such stricter asylum policies are possible, because when the grounds 
for asylum are depoliticized an obligation to grant them asylum fades away. To sum up, the 
sceptic perspective calls into question the simplistic generalization given to the climate-
migration nexus put forward by the alarmist perspective and sheds light on the political 
consequences. These political drivers and consequences are discussed in greater detail below. 
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Chapter four 
 
The discourse on climate change, ‘climate conflict’ and ‘climate refugees’ 
 
4.1. Discourse analysis and the importance of the media 
This next section discusses in greater detail the media’s portrayal of the Syrian conflict and 
the growing number of Syrian refugees moving to Europe. The media narrative is of 
importance, for it has a critical impact on the formation of the public discourse and policy 
formation on climate change. The media raises awareness and distributes knowledge. It acts 
as a forum for discussion on climate governance. On the one hand, media representations 
make sense of ongoing scientific research, and on the other hand they frame “climate change 
for policy, politics and the public” (Boykoff 2011, 3). In fact, research has shown that media 
attention has an influence on government activity, especially when it comes to climate change 
(Schmidt, Ivanova & Schäfer 2013, 5). The narrative surrounding an issue matters to 
determine whether it is or will become a political problem. The narrative has implications to 
questions such as ‘who is responsible’ or ‘what should be done’, which influences policy 
making.  
An analysis of the media and political discourse is of great importance to understand 
how climate change is currently perceived, how people make sense of the scientific research 
and how it should be addressed. Discourse can be defined as “an ensemble of ideas, concepts, 
and categories through which meaning is given to phenomena”, it “provides the tools with 
which problems are constructed” and importantly, “discourse structuration occurs when a 
discourse starts to dominate the way a society conceptualizes the world” (Hajer 1993, 45-6). 
For example, the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
definition of climate change aligns itself more with the scientific definition,18 but the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) focuses more on the human 
contribution to it.19 This has an impact on what to do about it and who or what is responsible. 
Likewise, the different usages of ‘climate change’ and ‘global warming’ invoke different 
reactions. While climate change can be regarded as a remote problem, global warming speaks 
more to people’s fears of an increasingly heating planet. 
 
																																								 																				
18 Climate change is “any change in climate over time whether due to natural variability or as a result of human 
activity” (IPCC 2001, Annex B). 
19 Climate change is “a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters 
the consumption of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability over comparable 
time periods” (quoted in IPCC 2001, Annex B). 
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4.2. Media representations on climate change 
Since the 1980s, climate change entered the public sphere. Many actors made enormous 
efforts to not only make people aware of the science, but also to try to increase engagement 
around the climate agenda (Boykoff 2011, 12-13). Since the turn of the millennium, the 
framing of climate change as a ‘threat’ become more prominent. In 2007, media 
representations about climate change peaked all over the world. Specific events contributed to 
this, such as Al Gore’s documentary ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ and the publication of the IPCC 
Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC 2007). After the economic recession, which got a lot more 
media attention, climate change again got increasing media attention in 2009 (Boykoff 2011, 
20-21; Schmidt, Ivanova & Schäfer 2013, 8). Mass media is a perfect instrument to distribute 
such messages and increase awareness. While using various media ‘frames’ and making bold 
claims, many actors try to influence the science, understanding and governance of climate 
change. Understandably, the way climate change is framed - as a threat, opportunity or 
problem - has a serious impact on policy priorities and responses from civil society (Boykoff 
2011, 11, 15). 
 While the media influences politics and civil society’s comprehension of climate 
change impacts, media representations exist within a larger political context as well. While it 
influences politics and scientific considerations, science and politics likewise influence the 
way the media portrays the impacts of climate change (Boykoff 2011, 29, 76). There is a 
danger in this. Mike Hulme has warned that “it seems that mere ‘climate change’ was not 
going to be bad enough, and so now must be ‘catastrophic’ to be worthy of attention” (Hulme 
2006). Using alarming discourse can therefore be used to provoke more - or less - alarmed 
responses in civil society and from policy makers (Boykoff 2011, 9). However, exiting news 
and fearful messages speak to the public and “feed readily into journalistic norms of 
dramatization and personalization”, resulting in their primacy over objective, dry, stories 
about climate change (Boykoff 2011, 16, 86). By framing climate change in this alarming way, 
emphasis is put on the danger of it on human security, trade and the economy, rather than the 
other way around. In terms of media headlines, “war linked to global warming” is a much 
more appealing one than “global warming might exacerbate some of the factors that can lead 
to conflict” (Westervelt 2015). This is precisely the case for the framing of climate change in 
Syria and the so-called ‘influxes’ of ‘climate refugees’. 
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4.3. The media narrative of climate change in Syria 
 
“This [climate change] can lead directly to refugees, or to unrest that produces even more 
refugees. The fabric that ties people to their homes is not as robust as we’d like to imagine. If 
you don’t believe it, there is a long line of displaced people heading your way to explain it to 
you” (Toles 2015). 
 
The overall narrative, which really took root after the Kelley et al. research of 2015, is an 
alarmist one. In short, migrants in Europe are depicted as being a threat to Western security. 
They have been forced to move as a result of climate change and the media makes wild 
speculations about future human displacement and ‘mass’ migrations. As discussed in length 
above, migration is multi-causal in nature and when people move in part as a result of 
environmental change, this displacement is often temporarily and over a short distance. The 
media reports are simplified accounts of this connection between climate change and 
migration and they represent the refugees as a source of chaos, causing future insecurity and 
instability, without solid evidence to support these claims. 
While most media reports connecting the drought with the conflict in Syria were 
published as a reaction to the Kelley et al. research, the ‘link’ was discussed before that, albeit 
to a lesser extent. In 2013, former advisor to President John F. Kennedy, William R. Polk, 
wrote an article on the issue that the population and resource ratio was out of balance in Syria. 
According to him, the conflict erupted because different groups were competing over scarce 
resources, thereby stating: “and so, tens of thousands of frightened, angry, hungry and 
impoverished former farmers were jammed into Syria’s towns and cities, where they 
constituted tinder ready to catch fire” (Polk 2013). In 2013 and 2014 two pieces on the 
drought in Syria, connecting it to the conflict, were also published in the New York Times. In 
those articles, the drought was told to be the key driver, but the failure to respond to the 
drought likewise played a huge role (Friedman 2013; Friedman 2014). When it comes to the 
narrative regarding Syria and climate change, headlines demonstrate that an apocalyptic 
narrative is describing the link between climate change, conflict and migration. This was 
already present in the headline of one of the articles just mentioned: “Without Water, 
Revolution” (Friedman 2013). 
 In reviewing multiple newspapers, with a focus on U.S. and European ones from 2015 
onwards, two key points stand out which are addressed by the media. The first is the argument 
that climate change has caused a severe drought that played a role in the onset of the violence 
in Syria in 2011. For example, The New York Times reported on the Kelley et al. research. It 
explained how the conflict was linked to a drought that was made worse by climate change 
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(Fountain 2015). The second key argument not only mentions that the draught led to the 
violence, but it highlights the migration from rural to urban areas, which attributed to the start 
of the conflict. For example, a National Geographic report repeated the Kelley et al. 
arguments that mass migration causes social stresses, which in turn had resulted in the 
uprisings (Fountain 2015). Media reports such as these are very vague, however, about the 
causality between migration and conflict, just as the Kelley et al. study was too. The 
Independent briefly touched upon the impact of scarcity, in line with Malthusian thinking, 
stating that: “experts have long predicted that climate change will be a major source of 
conflict as drought and rising temperatures hurt agriculture, putting a further strain on 
resources in already unstable regimes” (Bawden 2015). 
 Besides the connection between climate change and conflict, the media talks about two 
significant consequences of climate change in Syria: terrorism and refugees in Europe. The 
Toronto Star and Time, for example, presented the possible connection between climate 
change, Syria and the terrorist attacks in Europe (Burman 2015; Worland 2015) and The 
Atlantic argued that a “link between climate change and IS is not crazy” (Graham 2015). As 
mentioned the consequence of the refugees in Europe has also been discussed in many media 
reports. For example, a Time report argued “how climate change is behind the surge of 
migrants to Europe” (Baker 2015) and, as reported by CNN, Hillary Clinton argued that the 
refugee situation in Europe is a consequence of climate change (Merica 2015).  
Perhaps even more importantly, the media has made predictions about the future. The 
New Yorker argued that a binding climate deal is the best chance for preventing future 
conflict (Box & Klein 2015). The Guardian published two pieces, one arguing that “failure to 
act on climate change means an even bigger refugee crisis” and another that the current 
situation would become the “new normal” (Bennett 2015; O’Hagan 2015). The Washington 
Post ran a piece stating that “climate future will be the Syria refugee crisis times 100” (Toles 
2015) and The New Scientist argued that the Calais refugee camps were only a “taste of what 
a warmer world may bring” (Le Page 2015). Finally, another rather alarmist headline is from 
The Daily Impact: “A Tsunami of Climate Refugees is Drowning Europe” (Lewis 2015). 
However, as argued, most refugees remained within Syria, or at least in neighbouring 
countries. Climate change might cause some initial and internal movement, but the refugees in 
Europe have more to do with political factors than the drought that occurred years before. 
Safe to say, it is too simplistic to argue that the displacement to Europe took place because of 
climate change and it is highly doubtful that climate change will cause such movements in the 
future as predicted by the media. 
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On the one hand, one could hardly blame the media for simplifying the extensive research 
done on this difficult topic. On the other hand, however, there have also been reports that have 
been able to touch upon the simplistic link between climate change and conflict. An article in 
the Guardian, for example, expressed some doubt about an article published by the Guardian 
in that same week, stating that: “While researchers agree that climate change can exacerbate 
human conflict, there are many that caution against using it to explain the root causes of war” 
(Westervelt 2015). This piece even represents the precise criticism that many sceptics have on 
the alarmist narrative. Sceptic scholars warn that “work on this subject might 
disproportionately influence policy decisions in unproductive or even problematic directions” 
(Quote Edward Carr in Westervelt 2015). Alarming representations become significant when 
they make statements such as “if the government continues to move backwards on climate 
change, then we should get ready for a much bigger refugee crisis before long” (Bennet 2015) 
or “even if countries stick to their emission promises […] global temperature rise will soar 
past 2 °C. And illegal migration will soar along with the temperature” (Le Page 2015). To 
sum it up, the refugees from Syria have been depicted as threats to our future security and 
well-being (Randall 2016). The media focuses more on people’s fear of future migrants, 
instead of climate change itself. Without solid evidence to support this, the (future) refugees 
are depicted as a source of chaos and insecurity, and in the future only more will come knock 
on ‘our’ borders. Inadvertently, this narrative has serious political consequences. Yet, at the 
same time the narrative facilitates policy making as well. 
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Chapter five 
 
The benefits of an alarming discourse 
 
5.1. The securitization of climate change 
  
“Securitization is an active process, then: one that identifies a threat, specifies its character, 
taps into a ‘social imaginary’ of fear, and crafts a response that, presumably, is robust and 
effective in enhancing safety. How an authority or responsible power responds to a threat is 
crucial” (White 2011, 62). 
 
A link between climate change and security is not new and has been a policy matter since the 
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992. In a way, climate change could be 
regarded as securitized by reason of risk logic.20 However, it is not a neutral analysis, but 
subjected to many discursive lenses of which two have been discussed above (Boas & Ruthe 
2016, 614, 617). Initially, the risk of climate change entailed the more ‘obvious’ 
consequences, of which desertification and rising oceans are two examples. The risks are of a 
‘first order’: the direct changes of the weather and the environment that could occur as a result. 
As more people had started to be concerned about this, climate change entered the realm of 
‘high politics’. Various ‘green’ parties and politicians emerged and calls for sustainable 
development followed suit (Castles 2011, 415). With the turn of the century, climate change 
preoccupied many minds of politicians, journalists, NGOs and civil society. Considered as 
such, the focus of combating climate change was on mitigation and adaptation. The first 
entails the reduction of greenhouse gasses into the atmosphere. The second entails the 
adaptation to the consequences and impacts of climate change (Gemenne 2011, 247).  
Migration as a result of environmental degradation has mostly to do with adaptation, whether 
as adaptation to stay at one’s place of residence or one’s adaptation strategy to migrate 
somewhere else. This has been stressed in the IPCC reports, but not repeated in instruments 
related to this such as the Kyoto Protocol (Gemenne 2011, 247; IPCC 2014).  
Since the mid-2000s, the attention for the idea of climate change as a ‘second order’ 
security risk increased. The securitization of climate change in this perspective has to do with 
the potential spillover effects of climate change from the global South endangering the global 
North (Boas & Ruthe 2016, 615-16; Gemenne et al. 2014, 5; Hartmann 2010, 234-6). Since 
then, the problem of climate change was increasingly perceived as a national 21  and 
																																								 																				
20 This is visible from a definition of security: “the condition of being protected from threat and avoiding the 
absence of anxiety stemming from a fear of perceived danger” (White 2011, 60). 
21 In this thesis, a threat to national security is “an action or a sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and 
over a relatively brief period of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens 
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international security threat. This chapter will demonstrate why this has happened and 
concludes that it potentially shifts the focus from adaptation and mitigation to a focus on 
defence. While framing climate change as a security matter is a political move to raise more 
awareness, this chapter will demonstrate that even the best intentions could have negative 
side-effects. 
 
5.1.1. Europe 
In Europe, the ‘second order’ security risks of climate change became the focus of attention in 
the last decade. Reports from individual states contained apocalyptic future scenarios in which 
climate change threatens national and international security. Similar to reports from the U.S., 
they have argued that climate change is a security risk and have warned governments that 
climate change could act as a ‘threat multiplier’, a driver that amplifies other risks (U.S. CNA 
2007; Gemenne 2011, 231-2; Gemenne et al. 2014, 3; WBGU 2008, 1-13). The risk of 
extensive migration is also mentioned. An EU report has stated “Europe must expect 
substantially increased migratory pressure” (European Commission and the Secretary-
General/High Representative 2008, 7). A report by the German Advisory Council on Global 
Change (WBGU) stated that climate change was “jeopardizing national and international 
security to a new degree”, thereby mentioning the increased likelihood of environmental 
migration. Even though the report stated that most migration would be internal, it still 
emphasized that northern states should expect increased migration (WBGU 2008, 1; White 
2011, 77). During the U.N. Climate Conference in France in 2015, Jean-Claude Juncker, the 
president of the European Commission, told world leaders that climate change could 
“destabilize entire regions and start massive forced migrations and conflicts over natural 
resources” (Chan 2015). In other words, the emphasis on security and the prospect of 
‘millions of refugees’ has evolved into the securitization of climate change in Europe (White 
2011, 65). 
 
5.1.2. The United States 
The U.S. has started to shift its focus to environmental conflict as the result of climate change 
especially since 9/11 (White 2011, 64). In 2003, the Pentagon emphasized the climate-
security link and presented an apocalyptic future scenario of global food scarcity, millions of 
refugees and violent conflict (Schwartz & Randall 2003, 4-22). In that report, it urged the U.S. 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to a state or to private, non-governmental entities 
(persons, groups, corporations) within the state” (Ullman quoted in Levy 1995, 40). 
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government to take climate change seriously. Since then, the U.S. Department of Defence 
(DoD) released several other reports on climate change as a threat multiplier (Boas & Ruthe 
2016, 613). The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Center for a 
New American Security (CNAS) have even claimed that climate change is one of the biggest 
threats facing the U.S.: “the most worrisome problems […] are from large-scale migrations of 
people - both inside nations and across existing national borders” (Campbell et al. 2007, 9).22 
More recently, the Obama-Biden administration emphasized the climate-security nexus in 
various ways. First, the CIA established the Center for the Study of Climate Change in 2009. 
Second, in 2010, climate change was included as a security threat in the Quadrennial Defence 
review. And third, climate scientists were allowed to use defence and intelligence data (U.S. 
DoD 2010; White 2011, 81). The idea of climate change as a threat multiplier has become so 
mainstream in the U.S., that U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders mentioned it is “directly related to 
growth of terrorism” (Selby & Hulme 2015). Inside the U.S., the security risks of climate 
change have increasingly become an important matter of debate. A statement by the White 
House from 2015 aptly describes the U.S. outlook on the threat of climate change: 
 
“Many governments will face challenges to meet even the basic needs of their people as they 
confront demographic change, resource constraints, effects of climate change, and risks of 
global infectious disease outbreaks. These effects are threat multipliers that will aggravate 
stressors abroad such as poverty, environmental degradation, political instability, and social 
tensions – conditions that can enable terrorist activity and other forms of violence. The risk of 
conflict may increase” (White House 2015, 8). 
 
5.1.3. Internationally 
On an international level, the securitization of climate change is visible as well. In 2007, 
public opinion started to change tremendously (White 2011, 57). As discussed, the IPCC 
published its Fourth Assessment Report and the documentary of Al Gore was released. 
Concern likewise increased because the conflict in Darfur started to be explained as a climate-
conflict. 23  Substantial attention was given to this in the media and scholarly and policy 
circles.24 Ban Ki-Moon, U.N. Secretary General (UNSG) at the time, called Darfur the ‘first 
																																								 																				
22 In 2016, former-president Obama acknowledged this line of thinking with regard to IS, by stating that “ISIS is 
not an existential threat to the United States […] Climate change is a potential threat to the entire world if the we 
do not do something about it” (Obama in Johnson 2016). Al Gore has called it an existential threat already in 
2010 (Al Gore 2010). 
23  While scholars have explained the war as partly caused by climate change, the media narrative largely 
neglected the Sudanese government’s agricultural policies. Scarcity was a fact, but the situation was political in 
nature (Hartmann 2010, 233, 236). 
24 For example, in the Guardian (Borger 2007), U.N. News Centre (2007), The Atlantic (Faris 2007), BBC News 
(Black 2009), USA Today (Surmi 2007) and New Scientist (Brahic 2007). 
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climate change conflict’ (Notaras 2009).25 In that same year, the UNSC discussed this matter 
for the first time in a landmark session, as did the World Bank in 2008 and 2010. The UNSC 
has mentioned it again in 2011 and informally in 2013 (Boas & Ruthe 2016, 613-14; 
Gemenne 2011, 233; White 201, 84; World Bank 2008). Just this month, UNSG Antonio 
Guterres spoke on the subject, stating that “water, peace and security are inextricably 
interlinked” and that the U.N. would pursue preventive measures to limit water competition 
leading to conflicts both within and between states (Lederer 2017). The security discourse is 
therefore not likely to die out anytime soon. 
 
5.2. Benefits of securitizing climate change 
Homer-Dixon was one of the earliest scholars who used the security discourse to describe the 
growing problems of a changing climate (1999). Other various actors were brought together 
within this alarmist discourse through the perception that climate change would negatively 
affect the environment, cause instability and ignite conflicts and migration, which would in 
turn spillover and negatively affect the global North (Boas & Ruthe 2016, 620). Framing 
climate change as such is of use to a variety of actors, most of all politicians. Politicians need 
a discourse that supports their policy goals and ideologies, and this rhetoric of fear offers a 
useful way of framing climate change. In various manners discussed below, climate change 
has become a tool in policymaking. 
 
5.2.1. Calls for climate action 
First, it is more likely to draw attention to the problem of climate change by framing it as a 
security threat. It helps climate advocates to address the need to combat climate change for its 
negative effect on the world’s atmosphere and human livelihood. It can be used to demand 
recognition of the need to curb carbon emissions (Hartmann 2010, 239). Not only politicians 
use this discourse to help their cause. NGOs and aid agencies concerned with the climate use 
it as a way to mobilize support and get attention from policy makers (Castles 2011, 418; 
White 2011, 63). They argue that the world should be awakened to the dangers climate 
change poses. Indeed, research has found that fearful and dramatic representations can 
																																								 																				
25 Ban Ki-Moon has written an article in The Washington Post, saying that “amid the diverse social and political 
causes, the Darfur conflict began as an ecological crisis, arising at least in part from climate change” (Ki-Moon 
2007). 
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successfully raise awareness about the risks of climate change (Boykoff 2011, 16).26 The end 
seems to justify the means. This is in line with media reports that stress the need for 
governments to agree on climate deals. The aforementioned report by climate advocate Naomi 
Klein in The New Yorker is therefore a logical call for climate action at a governmental level. 
 
5.2.2. Border control 
A second reason for regarding climate change as a (national) security threat stems from the 
link between security and the fear of an outside threat. In the last couple of decades, anti-
immigration sentiment and the fear of ‘outsiders’ became an important matter of debate in 
public opinion and policy circles. Initially, the debate was focused on economic and societal 
security. People had a fear of losing their jobs to new immigrants. In the 1980s and 1990s, 
national security was linked to this. People started to perceive immigrants as ‘different’ than 
themselves. Because a security discourse is appealing to voters, it is no surprise that migration 
has been extremely ‘electoralized’ in Western states (White 2011, 15, 57-8).  
Now that there is a growing public fear of the potential ‘second order’ consequences 
of climate change, such as conflict, instability and immigration, climate refugees likewise 
speak to people’s fears and they have started to be seen as a ‘threat’ to ‘our’ national security 
(Hartmann 2010, 236; White 2011, 5). Because the term ‘climate refugees’ has no legal basis 
– climate refugees enjoy no protection under the Geneva Convention – politicians are able to 
securitize climate migration as well (Fernández 2015, 42-3). The security discourse enables a 
strong state response and benefits politicians who wish to set up stricter border controls. 
Combining the fear of refugees and climate change creates a powerful narrative to achieve 
this goal (Myer 2013, 108-9; White 2011, 24, 65). In other words, the association of climate 
change with migration has made both climate change and immigration a threat to ‘us’ and 
more importantly, “the fear of migration multiplied by the uncertainties linked to climate 
change results in a persuasive discourse that can justify almost any form of policy” (Mayer 
2013, 117). 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
26 As concluded by Klare: “as if there were not already enough good reasons to take swift action to curb 
emissions of greenhouse gases, the prospect of increased armed conflict should, one would hope, convince those 
still unaware of the magnitude of the danger” (2007, 361). 
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5.3. Consequences of securitizing climate change 
 
5.3.1. Internal displacement 
Looking at the Syrian Civil War and refugee crisis, several negative consequences of the 
security discourse become clear. The first entails the failure to recognize internally displaced 
persons. There is no question that climate change has the potential to affect human movement. 
However, the idea that climate change will always cause chaos, violence, extremism and mass 
migration does not match reality. To argue that people move because of climate change as the 
sole driver is rarely based on strong evidence and very hard to detect. Exceptions could be 
sudden disasters such as floods or hurricanes or slow-onset disasters such as the drought in 
Syria, which could in some cases increase the likelihood of migration. However, such 
movement is in mostly internal and for a limited period of time, rather than the permanent 
international displacement many politicians talk about (Mayer 2013, 100). Moreover, 
migration could even be hindered as a result of climate change, due to economic hardships. 
The poorest people are trapped in place, without money to move in search of better 
livelihoods, let alone to migrate to wealthy countries thousands of miles away. 
Environmentalists should, therefore, reflect on regarding the poor people who are the most 
vulnerable to climate change as a security threat (Boas 2016; Hartmann 2010, 241). The 
security discourse on the Syrian refugee crisis is flawed and results in the simplification and 
neglect of the real effects of climate change on migration. 
 
5.3.2. ‘All refugees are dangerous and bad’ 
Another problem with the use of the alarmist discourse is related to the case of Syria. The 
securitization of climate change strengthens the stigmatization of refugees. Across the world, 
refugees encounter discrimination, which is fuelled by (far-right) political parties (Randall 
2014). The discourse thus supports the stereotype of refugees as ‘dangerous’ and ‘bad’. While 
many use the discourse with good intentions – climate change should be controlled in order to 
limit the occurrence of climate refugees – this does not help the refugees but merely supports 
the discourse that frames them as a threat, fuelling anti-refugee sentiment. The strengthening 
of the discourse therefore increases the stigmatization of all refugees crossing international 
borders (Castles 2011, 417). 
 There is no doubt that migration poses an ethical dilemma: who should bear the 
responsibility to give shelter and asylum to refugees? Certain politicians have used the 
security discourse to promote strict border controls, resulting to the de-politicization of 
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climate migration: as long as they do not fit under the Geneva Convention, they do not 
‘deserve’ asylum. While people rarely migrate as a direct result of climate change, framing 
refugees in that way might exempt politicians from asylum obligations. This, however, creates 
a security dilemma. It means that the obligation to provide relief and shelter to refugees is 
shifted from one state to the other. One could speak of some sort of “remote immigration 
control” (Fernández 2015, 42-3; White 2011, 8). As Castles put it: “by creating fears of mass 
influxes of ‘misery of the world’ to the rich countries, politicians and the media have 
encouraged racist and restrictionist responses which offer nothing to address the issues” (2011, 
426). 
 This has been the case for the Syrian refugees. European politicians have been trying 
to keep as many of them in the peripheries of the EU or in countries neighbouring Syria, such 
as Turkey. Relief and shelter in the region have become the new goal. While some reasons for 
this policy might be based on good intentions – to help them close to home in their own 
environment – the result is not always the desired one. For example, Amnesty International 
concluded that the EU-Turkey refugee deal has led to extremely poor living conditions for 
thousands of refugees on the Greek islands. Gauri van Gulik, Amnesty International’s Deputy 
Director for Europe, stresses the importance of human rights protection and warned against 
repeating this deal: “Leaders who claim that the EU-Turkey deal could be a blueprint for new 
ones with countries like Libya, Sudan, Niger and elsewhere should look at the horrible 
consequences and be warned: this should never be repeated” (Amnesty International 2017). In 
sum, the discourse stigmatizes refugees and provides a strong state response, rather than raise 
environmental awareness and make calls for the shared responsibility to help those most in 
need. The security discourse enables politicians to base their policy on fear rather than facts 
based on strong evidence.  
 
5.3.3. ‘Letting those responsible off the hook’ 
The security discourse makes states respond to the indirect threats climate change could pose 
to state stability and resource scarcity, rather than making them address the root causes of the 
problem (Gemenne et al. 2014, 7). For example, it is true that Syrian migrants from rural 
areas came to the cities, which were already full of Iraqi refugees. However, the role played 
by other nations in creating the refugee crisis in the Middle East, which has occurred ever 
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since the start of the 2003 Iraq invasion, should also be acknowledged (Böhm, 2015).27 An 
emphasis on climate change and climate refugees disregards the interplaying political and 
economic factors on which the occurrence and extent of conflict and migration rests 
(Morrissey 2008, 29). This is also the case for the eruption of violence in Syria. While climate 
did play a role, the violence was mostly the result of unsustainable policies, mismanagement 
of natural resources and growing economic, political and social discontent among the Syrian 
population. The focus on climate change diverts attention away from the root causes of the 
conflict and “allows the Assad regime to blame external factors for its own failures” (De 
Châtel 2014, 522).28 The argument that climate change causes violence and refugees makes 
war as something inevitable. In that way, the responsibility of humans tends to be cleared. It 
stresses the climate’s agency - and paints Syria as subjected to external factors outside of its 
control - thereby diminishing human responsibility for the violence and its consequences. In 
that way, other causes of war tend to be de-politicized. 
Whether people migrate significantly depends on their ability to adapt or cope with 
environmental change. Emphasizing the threat of migration, does not result in adequate 
policies to significantly limit migration, but merely limits the benefits migrants should receive 
(Commission on Climate Change and Development 2009, 69; Hartmann 2010, 234, 237). 
Indeed, by calling them climate refugees, the most important reason for their flight is 
neglected: the devastating civil war. In that way, one tends to neglect the distinction between 
genuine and perceived threats people face as a result of climate change. More attention is 
given to the ones who are indirectly facing the potential consequences of climate change in 
the global North instead to those who actually have to deal with environmental changes in the 
global South. In other words, “climate change as a security threat likely undermines, rather 
than strengthens, serious efforts to link climate change mitigation and adaptation to 
development efforts that reduce poverty and promote equity” (Hartmann 2010, 239). By using 
the security discourse, blame is put on the wrong factors and actors. It gives an excuse to 
leave other issues related to the conflict unaddressed. Blame seems to be put solely on nature 
(Livingstone 2015). In other words, when attention is put on climate change as the causal 
factor, other determining factors tend to be overlooked. 
 
																																								 																				
27 Böhm additionally argues that the interference by the West in the Middle East is “one of the root causes of the 
current Syrian tragedy” and stresses the importance of the “political economy of water which has played a 
significant role in the Middle East for many decades” (Böhm 2015). 
28 The Daily Caller reported that during a speech, former-president Obama likewise shifted the “blame for the 
deadly conflict from the repressive Assad regime to people driving gas-guzzling SUVs” (Bastasch 2016). 
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5.3.4. The militarization of climate change 
Securitizing climate change has another consequence. Since it is regarded as a national 
security matter, the issue is discussed in defence circles. It is in a state’s national interest to 
prevent instability and expensive interventions by addressing the underlying causes present in 
foreign states. It is not surprising, then, that the first reports on this subject stem from 
military-attempts to link climate change to security interests (Selby & Hulme 2015). While 
attention and action is good, the direction in which it goes is of importance - and the direction 
it is going is potentially the wrong one. The securitization of climate change could militarize 
climate change, rather than maintain attention on preventive action, mitigation and adaptation 
measures. Combating climate change is no longer the focus of attention, but the security 
reaction against the potential threats it poses is (Elliot 2010, 180-1; White 2011, 125).  
Already in 1988 during a world conference, a statement was issued emphasizing the 
need that governments need to realign “their national security and military spending priorities” 
by addressing “the geopolitical dimensions of climate change in resource allocation decisions” 
(Livingstone 2015). Examples from the U.S. demonstrate how the militarization of climate 
change has proceeded since then.29 Among U.S. national security experts there is a consensus 
that climate change is one of the causes of instability, it is a threat multiplier and it should be 
addressed as a national security concern (Kenney 2017). In 2007, a report by the U.S. Center 
for Naval Analyses stressed the concern that “climate change will stress the U.S. military by 
affecting weapon systems and platforms, bases and military operations” (U.S. CNA 2007, 37). 
In January 2016, Deputy Secretary of Defence Robert Work argued that “All DoD operations 
worldwide must be able to adapt current and future operations to address the impacts of 
climate change in order to maintain an effective and efficient U.S. military” (Johnson 2016).30 
Just in January 2017, U.S. Secretary of Defence James Mattis argued to the Senate Armed 
Services Committee that climate change is a national security issue and he linked this to the 
U.S. military: [climate change is] "impacting stability in areas of the world where our troops 
are operating today" (Mattis quoted in Garcia-Navarro 2017). In an interview, Brigadier 
General Gerald Galloway from the Center for Climate and Security, argued that “instability 
breeds conflict” and droughts are likely to cause instability. He discussed the impact of 
																																								 																				
29 The US is taken as an example, but it is likewise visible – albeit to a lesser extent – in other countries, such as 
The Netherlands. For example, the Dutch Chief of Defence argued in December 2016 that “climate change is a 
source of a lot of problems we are facing today, like extremism and instability” and that “he cannot guarantee 
stability without climate security” (own translation of Middendorp in NOS 2016). Dutch Foreign Minister Bert 
Koenders likewise told in a speech at the Planetary Security Conference that “climate and peace are intimately 
linked” (Koenders 2016). 
30 Importantly, DoD directives stay in place for ten years. Even with the new Trump administration, it is not 
likely that the focus of the military on climate change is disappearing anytime soon (Johnson 2016). 
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climate change extensively in a similar way. The focus lay on the U.S. military’s presence in 
foreign countries, not so much on the population of the country (Galloway in Garcia-Navarro 
2017).31  
The attention is therefore not directed at combating climate change, but at preparing 
for the consequences of climate change. Of course, one should prepare for the (indirect) 
consequences of a changing climate. However, this militarized focus is not entirely necessary. 
The instability the military envisions is less the case than one would expect. While the link 
between climate, conflict and migration seems to make a lot of sense, people are more likely 
not to use violence when a drought occurs. In case violence does erupt, this mostly stems 
from existing socioeconomic and political factors; not climate change. The militarization of 
climate change thus creates a security reaction against a ‘non-threat’ (Boas 2017; White 2011, 
125). Many acknowledge that climate change ‘indirectly’ is connected to conflict and 
migration, which is true. But then a lot of other factors are indirectly connected to instability 
as well. Should education and social security also become a matter of discussion for the 
military or in the UNSC? The military should not fight these battles, or we might risk 
militarizing developmental and humanitarian aid as well (Hartmann 2010, 242). 
Second, and more importantly, the militarization perceives the issue of climate change 
not as an opportunity to heal the environment but as another enemy that it needs to combat 
and build a weapon and defence system against (Livingstone 2015). As a result, instead of 
combating climate change it is enhancing further damage to the environment. It results in the 
extended use of fossil fuels with the justification that wars need to be prepared for and 
invested in. In addition, more machinery and equipment is needed to deal with the 
consequences of climate change (Livingstone 2015). 32  It seems that the military is less 
concerned with the actual consequences for the planet and mankind and more focused on its 
budget, weapon systems and war plans. While preparing for the consequences of climate 
change, it is actually making it worse. One should be wary that the distinction between 
																																								 																				
31 When asked about President Trump’s refusal to combat climate change, he argued: “But I will tell you the 
Defence Department has been a leader since 2003 in dealing with these issues, identifying what they are, coming 
to the Congress and saying, we need to work in this direction. And if we do this, we think we can be prepared for 
it. Now, if that's pushed off the plate, that's a different issue, but I don't see someone who is told this is a national 
security issue saying, no, don't do that” (Galloway in Garcia-Navarro 2017). 
32 For example, retired Navy Rear Admiral David Titley has said in an interview that the “US military is 
preparing for conflict” and he sees “climate change as a driving force in the 21st century” (Titley in Holthaus 
2014). Former Secretary of Defence, Chuck Hagel, argued that the military and the way it executes its missions 
will be affected by climate change and “our armed forces must prepare for a future with a wide spectrum of 
possible threats […] the Defence Department will keep pace with a changing climate, minimize its impact on our 
missions, and continue to protect our natural security” (Hagel in Banusiewicz 2014).  
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climate action and military action is starting to become blurred. A defence response might 
limit the mitigation and adaptation approach to combating climate change. 
 
5.4. A politicized environment 
 
“Central to the idea of a politicized environment is the recognition that environmental 
problems cannot be understood in isolation from the political and economic contexts within 
which they are created ... Indeed, the very definition of an environmental ‘problem’, and the 
priority attached to that problem by society, may itself be a reflection of those same processes” 
(Bryant & Bailey 1997, 28). 
 
The securitization discourse has politicized the environment in various ways. Climate change 
is not merely a phenomenon that needs to be controlled, but people use it as a tool to promote 
their benefits and interests (Boykoff 2011, 1). Syria is a recent example of the usage of 
climate change: “to warn for a state of chaos and mass migration in a future warmer world 
heavily affected by climate change” (Boas 2016). However, the alarmist and simplistic 
discourse on the relationship between climate change, conflict and migration promote climate 
reductionism (Livingstone 2015). The agency of climate change has become the centre of 
attention, rather than human agency. This seems to bring relief: the climate frees politicians 
from responsibility for causing the conflict, or politicians who no longer know how to solve 
the conflict. All actors involved are in that way relieved from moral accountability. The 
ethical concern of human agency in all wars is diminished with the politicization and 
securitization of climate change: “our agency is undone by our self-interest” (Gemenne 2015, 
71). It is a paradox indeed: demanding climate action while at the same time releasing 
mankind from blame in causing the world’s problems. 
 
5.5. Concluding remarks: a reversed shift in attention 
 
“Humans are political animals and the use of natural resources is a political act in which 
people interact at different levels between which various power relations exist” (Wessels 2008, 
53).33 
 
The world we currently live in is experiencing the worst refugee and migrant crisis since 
World War II. At the same time, while nationalism and calls for closed borders increase, we 
are experiencing extensive famines all over the world. These are not the result of climate 
change, but of war. In other words, humans are still the cause of most of the misery in the 
																																								 																				
33 In a similar manner, Wessels argued that water scarcity is a result of the human use of it for agriculture. 
Moreover, she stressed that nations in the Middle East need to import more food, grow less of their own wheat 
and should diversify their economies (Wessels 2009, 137-8). 
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world. The state should be regarded as the intervening variable that it is: it has significant 
influence on the occurrence of violence and the degree of vulnerability of its people. 
Fortunately, the level of vulnerability and adaptability is largely determined by factors that are 
not of an environmental, but of a political and economic nature. In theory, a state is therefore 
able to limit the negative impact of climate change (Brown & McLeman 2009, 300). In other 
words, the human factor in providing safety, security and less vulnerability in times of climate 
change should not be forgotten. 
Further research could, therefore, refrain from solely researching whether or not 
climate change leads to conflict. Rather, a renewed debate on adaptation and mitigation is 
needed.34 Further research could focus on communities in which cooperation, conflict or 
prevention has occurred when dealing with climate risks. These studies could offer best-
practice scenarios – or warnings – on how best to deal with environmental change (Boas 
2016). Moreover, in line with Boas and Ruthe’s research, more attention could be given to 
ways to increase resilience.35 In that way, the political will, which is not always present, is 
less necessary, because the responsibility to boost resilience lies with communities and 
individuals. Whereas defence strategies are short-term solutions, resilience is more concerned 
with long-term thinking (Boas & Ruthe 2016, 622-28).  
The Syrian conflict has proven to be but one example of the role of human agency in 
causing human misery. The war has caused far greater water and food insecurity than the 
drought ever has. On the other hand, the impact of conflict on the world’s climate tends to be 
neglected. It takes a lot of natural resources and greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere to wage 
war. Perhaps a new emphasis could therefore also be directed on the reverse connection 
between climate change and conflict. While climate change could hurt the planet and all 
living beings, conflicts always hurt them, and, in reverse, increase further climate change. 
With this renewed shift in attention, war will not be regarded as an inevitable and unstoppable 
phenomenon as the planet increases to experience climate change. Rather, it could bring 
societies together and lead to constructive engagement between states with the exchange of 
technologies and experience. Shared responsibility could enhance peace instead of war. In this 
way, a new climate discourse of international cooperation, equity and justice is possible. 
																																								 																				
34 For example, vulnerability could be tackled in two ways: minimizing the negative impact climate change has 
on rural communities and enhancing the capacity of cities to absorb an increasing number of people (Campbell 
& Goddard 2015). For example, in the case of Syria, when stability returns it is important that the regime focuses 
on sustainable water management, implementing long-term agricultural reforms and modern irrigation 
techniques (Gleick 2014, 338). 
35 Resilience “refers to the capability of systems or communities to ‘bounce back’, i.e. to recover after external 
shocks (e.g. natural disasters), and to adapt to changing environmental conditions” (Boas & Ruthe 2016, 616). 
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Conclusion 
 
Climate change, conflict and migration are interlinked. The drought in Syria has demonstrated 
how climate change could disrupt people’s livelihoods. Climate change can, therefore, 
indirectly cause migration. But the word ‘cause’ should be used carefully. Syria has 
demonstrated that political and economic factors play a significant part in the eruption of 
conflict and they determine to what extent any environmental change will affect humans. It is 
true that the drought affected human security by diminishing crops and livestock. This led to a 
migration from rural to urban areas. Even though it seems self-evident that this might result in 
tensions among the people, this is not supported by evidence. Rather, people started to work 
together, joined forces and united in their shared grievances. They turned their discontent 
towards the state, which was more likely to result in a peaceful uprising thanks to the overall 
context of the 2011 Arab Spring. To answer the first sub question of chapter one, climate 
change played a role, but was not the most important factor leading up to the conflict. Indeed, 
climate change would never result in conflict on its own. The political and economic context 
of a country is more important. 
  There is no doubt that climate change could impact migration. Sudden natural 
disasters are the most obvious examples of this. Even slow-onset disasters potentially affect 
migration. In Syria, this resulted in the rural-urban migration. Contrary to popular believe, 
most of such migration is temporarily and takes place over a short distance. We could ask 
ourselves: would I move to a country 5000 miles away if my town is flooded? Or would I go 
to the nearest safe place, look for relatives in the nearby areas? And would I want to come 
back? Evidence has shown that most environmental migration is internal migration. Moreover, 
not everyone is able to move, which leaves a lot of people trapped in place rather than 
becoming a ‘climate refugee’. The external migration of many Syrians is therefore not the 
result of the drought or climate change in general. This migration is the result of conflict, 
which was indirectly ‘caused’ by environmental change. To call the refugees fleeing Syria 
and coming to Europe ‘climate refugees’ is, however, incorrect. They are fleeing because of 
the continued violence, their destroyed homes and fear for their lives. Climate change thus has 
played a small role in the migration of Syrians, but not in the way that is commonly thought. 
Even if one could detect a climate refugee - someone solely fleeing because of environmental 
change - this person will not be found in Europe but still as close to his or her home as 
possible. 
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It is not strange that most people have made this connection between climate change, conflict 
and migration. It is based on simplistic Malthusian thinking, disregarding the importance of 
human agency and politics when it comes to our relationship with the environment. As this 
thesis has demonstrated, the simplistic notion of ‘population growth, tensions, scarcity and 
conflict’ is not based on solid evidence. However, in the media, among scholars and in policy 
circles, this connection has gotten most attention. It speaks to people’s most feared scenarios: 
the apocalypse and the end of the world as we know it. The Syrian Civil War and the Syrian 
refugees have been portrayed in a similar manner in the media. Fears of ‘Europe being 
drowned by climate refugees’, ‘climate change causing conflicts’ and ‘a warming world will 
result in the Syrian refugee crisis times 100’, have been expressed in multiple media outlets. 
Climate change and refugees have become the centre of a threat that must be dealt with at a 
governmental level. 
 The most important question remains. Why is the Syrian Civil War explained like it 
was? In whose interest is it to frame the war and the refugees in this manner? As this thesis 
has shown, the alarming narrative regarding Syria really took root after the Kelley et al. (2015) 
research. While the securitization of climate change had started to take place several years 
before its publication, this research seemingly was the last piece of ‘evidence’ politicians and 
the media needed. It offered an appealing discourse for many. Climate advocates warned 
against the dangers of a heating world, therefore trying to raise awareness for the need to 
combat climate change. Some politicians probably had the same intentions. However, others 
used the discourse in order to further securitize immigration. While simultaneously 
acknowledging the indirect link between climate change and conflict - climate change is 
‘merely’ a threat multiplier - it enabled a strong state response against the coming anarchy and 
chaos from the South to the North. Even though this should imply the risks of climate change, 
the focus is derived from strategies of mitigation and adaptation to depoliticizing the causes of 
conflict and migration, leaving politicians without responsibility to deal with the root causes. 
The complexity of war is diminished to one dimension, exonerating moral responsibility from 
the agents of conflict and the international community from solving the conflict and dealing 
with its consequences. 
My own outlook – as demonstrated in this thesis - is a sceptic one in accordance with 
political ecology thinking. There is a connection between environmental change and politics 
that should not be overlooked. The security discourse leads to short-term solutions and solely 
focuses on measures to ensure national security. In other words, state-interests are deemed 
more important than combating climate change and its actual consequences. Climate change 
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has become a tool in promoting one’s own interests. This is understandable. Focusing on 
mitigation and adaptation likewise promotes our own interests: protecting the planet we live 
on and to making sure future generations can enjoy it too. However, to a greater extent, 
climate change has been used as a shield to promote other interests as well. Interests that have 
little to do with the environment. The securitization of climate change has politicized the 
environment, which might actually do more harm than good. 
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